



REINVENT Inception Assessment Summary

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



This report captures and distils findings from secondary and primary data analysis undertaken between July-August 2019 as part of the inception phase of the REINVENT Programme¹. This programme is funded by UKaid with Coffey International leading the programme implementation in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) and the Danish Demining Group (DDG).

By using community-driven approaches that leverage the role of women and girls in peaceful inter and intra communal coexistence, REINVENT is pioneering new, strategic approaches to implementation of six workstreams: Peacebuilding, Police Reform, Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG), Election Security, Conflict Sensitive Development and Countering Violent Extremism.

Building on the recommendations from the Kenya Improving Community Security - Jamii Thabiti (KICS-JT) Programme Completion Report², this assessment sought to:

1. *Map out regional and county security and risk profiles highlighting key priority needs/entry points/influencers for each county/region as relates to matters of safety and security*
2. *Establish factors for change in relation to securing police reforms, peacebuilding, development, elections and safety of women and girls in each of the county/region*
3. *Propose niche interventions and themes for REINVENT and opportunities to influence change in the target counties/regions*
4. *Develop a national, regional and county offer to deliver the REINVENT Programme*
5. *Undertake detailed police stations and stakeholders mapping in each of the counties*

The assessment commenced in mid-July 2019 and involved a sample of 700 key informants at national, regional, county and community levels as primary data. These included Government officials working at regional and county levels; police commanders. Other respondents were non-state actors (CSOs and service providers), community members (men, women, youth, persons with disabilities, etc.) and leaders. Key informant interviews focus group discussions and non-participant observations methods were used to collect data.

The report is structured in two core sections. The first section presents the summary findings for each workstream and the second section provides an analysis of police stations and stakeholders.

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¹ The Reducing Insecurity and Violent Extremism in the Northern and Coastal regions of Kenya (REINVENT) Programme is a five-year programme that seeks strengthen the capacity of state and non-state actors to reduce violence and conflict and improve security and stability in Kenya

² KICS-JT sought to address criminal violence, inter-communal violence, and violence against women and girls (VAWG) in Western (Kisumu and Bungoma); Rift (Nakuru and Baringo); Coast (Kwale and Kilifi); and North-Eastern (Mandera and Wajir)

INTRODUCTION

The security and development nexus in post-independence Kenya has undergone major reconfiguration as exerted by both pull and push factors witnessed in the clamour for a new Constitutional dispensation. While the country implemented a new constitution in 2010 with a new governance structure, the mutating nature of conflict, violence and resource/privilege contestation among and between communities, the State and communities and private corporations and local communities provides an opportunity for ongoing development and security programming.

With funding from UKAid, Coffey International delivered the Kenya Improving Community Security - Jamii Thabiti (KICS-JT) Programme from 2014-2018 targeting key safety and security institutions. The programme sought to prevent and respond to three forms of violence: criminal violence, inter-communal violence, and violence against women and girls (VAWG) in eight counties clustered by region: Western (Kisumu and Bungoma); Rift (Nakuru and Baringo); Coast (Kwale and Kilifi); and North-Eastern (Mandera and Wajir).

At the end of the KICS-JT intervention, the endline evaluation established that given the fluidity and spill-over of conflicts across the eight counties and forms of violence, there is need for future security and development programming to focus on additional counties and expand the thematic focus to include conflict sensitive development (CSD), election security and countering violent extremism (CVE).

The big four agenda, coupled with Vision 2030 projects, have brought about the demand for large-scale development and investment projects that now compete with existing unresolved grievances over access and control of natural resources including land, water and mineral resources. Border disputes and political contestations before, during and after elections seem not to abate, despite strides made in the electoral management process and as a result, political conflicts have become part and parcel of the electoral cycle. The situation is worsened by lethargy in police reforms process, wrong and inadequate preparation of police regarding public order management and gendering police responses. Moreover, the dwindling role of traditional institutions and social contracts in conflict management and increasing reliance on political settlements have sustained a climate of impunity and communities resorting to self-defence vigilantes and individual rationalisation in using violence to settle scores or obtain justice in their terms.

In the recent past, radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism has emerged as a key peace and security agenda in the Muslim dominated areas of North Eastern, Upper Eastern, Nairobi and the Coastal region. Real or perceived marginalisation of the minority Muslim communities in Kenya by successive post-independence governments as evidenced by poor physical infrastructure, below national average indices in health and education sectors and poor integration of the Muslims, especially the Somali community, into the national social fabric, profiling and collective punishment of the Muslim community in the wake of extremist attacks, cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances are some of the known push, pull and enabling factors of radicalisation and violent extremism (VE) in Kenya.

In essence, to deliver robust policy, institutional and behavioural change requires more than changing laws. An opportunity therefore exists in delivering a new security and development programme in 18 counties within four regions to address Police Reform, Peacebuilding, VAWG, Election Security, CVE and CSD using an integrated approach. The next section provides topline findings from primary and secondary research on the strategic delivery of each workstream.



While the country implemented a new constitution in 2010 with a new governance structure, the mutating nature of conflict, violence and resource/privilege contestation among and between communities, the State and communities and private corporations and local communities provides an opportunity for ongoing development and security programming.



SUMMARY FINDINGS

This section provides a summary of the key findings from primary and secondary research broken down by programmatic workstreams.

1) Securing and advancing gains in police reforms

The Context: Governance and politics play a key role in understanding the political economy of Kenya. Kenya's economy is largely affected by the politics of the day, the bloated governance system, entrenched corruption, lack of goodwill to combat the vices and revamp the economy, and a huge gap between the rich and the poor. In this section, we will highlight Kenya's governance structure to enable an understanding of how this affects the political economy. The reforms in the security sector would further have a direct impact on the management of elections and in particular, election security saw major plans. These plans included the development of a proper deployment plan for security agencies managing elections, requisite training for all the security personnel managing the elections, proper chain of command within the security services, adequate and proper tools for the security agencies managing the elections and an increased number of security officers during the election period.

Challenges

Poor Police- Community Relations: There is systemic and structural contestation and inability of ranks, units, departments and directorates to work in unison to deliver on the aspirations of community policing. At the same time, different agencies/formations interpret and apply community policing selectively and in their own interpretation pointing to the lack of a guiding vision on what community policing entails and excludes. With this situation, the National Police Service (NPS) lacks resource allocation for community policing activities and there is a strong preference for canine approaches to crime prevention and response than effective community policing.

Weak Accountability Framework to address Police Misconduct: The majority of complaints from the public are to do with extortion, verbal abuse, disrespectful treatment and in some cases, assault. Ideally, these should be handled by police commanders or escalated to the police Internal Affairs Unit (IAU). From all the counties, however, the IAU is relatively unknown to the public – certainly less known than the IPOA, whose reach is limited in that it only takes up the most serious cases such as deaths and serious injuries as a result of police action. Nationally, there is an unwritten “political and policy” from the security leadership at the Ministry of Interior (MoI) that the pursuit of police accountability has “weakened” police effectiveness and what is needed is “more support to the police” to deal with crime.

Minimal Police Capacity to handle Terrorism and Violent Extremism: There is overburdening of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) to respond to all matters of violent extremism as regular police formations are not yet violent extremism prevention and response ready. Moreover, the ATPU posture is purely Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) as opposed to Prevention and it lacks policy and operational guidance in accountability of its actions or with other formations during Joint Taskforce/ Multi agency Special Operations. This grants it a carte blanche status that allows the commission and cover up of extrajudicial actions against communities.

Weaknesses in Public order policing: Although police excesses are most visible with respect to elections, it is not a “policing of elections problem” but a “policing of protests and public order problem.” Many officers also believe that the way to handle protests is to use maximum force. Moreover, the police do not have the proper tools and equipment to handle protests and in many instances, they are only armed with rifles with live ammunition.



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Strengthen policing accountability and oversight work – both through the state mechanisms and non-state actors.

Entry opportunities for REINVENT

- ❖ Align its interventions to address both police culture and the institutional, policy and legal reforms. The MoI holds the key to what areas of police reforms will be prioritised and given budget support. One key area of support is the Police Reforms Multi-Stakeholder Initiative.
- ❖ Adopt both a national level process of promoting reforms through the Director of Reforms at the NPS, the Inspector General (IG) and the MoI. The leadership of the MoI is crucial as it has a quality review and oversight function under the NPS Act.
- ❖ Strengthen policing accountability and oversight work – both through the state mechanisms and non-state actors.
- ❖ Continue strategic support to both demand and supply side of accountability. Support to the emergence and growth of actors in the various counties of interest is important to strengthen the demand side.
- ❖ Support state accountability institutions, in particular the IAU, to change police behaviour and to reach out to the public with information on its mandate and the channels and means for presenting complaints.
- ❖ Support the MoI and the National Police Service Commission (NPSC) to design an incentives framework for strengthening police-community relations. NPSC could begin to use the indicators from such a framework in promotion of individual police officers.
- ❖ Continue working with a mix of support to police commanders at local levels as part of keeping the doors open and winning support for the programme implementation but be conscious that this is not where programme success is likely to be achieved.
- ❖ Work with Ministry of Interior to enact better legislation on public gatherings – a more comprehensive law than the Public Order Act is necessary to address the many areas of gaps.



2) Countering Violent Extremism

The Context: Kenya's proximity to Somalia – which still does not have a functional and effective government – and the porousness of its border makes it easy for the movement of extremists and their recruits. Al Shabaab sympathisers, recruiters and sleepers can cross and easily blend into local communities in North Eastern and Coastal regions given the geography and demography of these regions. This homegrown network of radicalisers and recruiters has slowly expanded its operations and activities beyond the coast to other parts of the country such as Western, Nairobi, and Eastern regions among others. Until recently, most of the focus on VE has been with respect to young men. Increasingly however, in Kenya and globally the role of women as terrorists, as family and as agents for prevention has become more prominent. This will remain an area of continued policy and programmatic interest since the data and information available is still modest.

Challenges

Prominence of structural, ideological and individual explanations: The assessment did not find any new explanation for the radicalisation and recruitment of young people into VE beyond what is documented in various studies. Respondents spoke of joblessness and lack of opportunities for youths as an important structural factor making them vulnerable to recruitment. There is clearly a disconnect between actors working on structural conditions, such as youth employment and those working on prevention of VE. This disconnect is part of the reason why it is difficult to establish the extent of the impact of various programmatic interventions by non-state actors.

Returnees remain an important challenge: In both North Eastern and the Coast, the issue of returnees remains a major security challenge. This is more so at the Coast and in Kwale than in North Eastern Kenya. These returnees are said to be in hundreds and living undercover, as no one wants to acknowledge their existence. There are speculations that they are responsible for the killings of authority figures such as imams and village elders in Kwale, and also allegations that many of them have been secretly killed by security forces or Al Shabaab itself. No programme exists for facilitating their rehabilitation or reintegration into the community.

Excesses by security agencies: State security operations to address VE have had both a positive and negative impact. However, excesses by both the ATPU and the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) continue to undermine efforts at police reforms and are cited as part of the explanations for youths joining groups like Al Shabaab. There are many allegations of extrajudicial executions of suspected terrorists as well as the collective punishment of communities in North Eastern and Coastal regions. Many respondents noted that the KDF has a poor record in how it deals with communities in its counterterrorism operations. Whereas the police make efforts to interact with local communities, for many in the areas where KDF is in operation, there is virtually no interaction and residents have no-where to channel their complaints against the military.

Recent amendments to POTA: In July, the amendments to Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) were signed into law. These amendments now require groups working on VE seek authorisation from the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC). Despite verbal commitments from NCTC that the intention is not to restrict civic space on the issue, there are risks that these amendments will in the future be used to restrict groups critical of the security agencies.



Entry opportunities for REINVENT

- ❖ Design interventions that speak to the structural linkages of VE in terms of vulnerabilities of potential recruits, an enabling VE economy and agent network that facilitates recruitment and community sympathy to the VE ideology. Partnerships with other DFID/FCO programmes can be a useful way of making this linkage.
- ❖ Establish an accountability programme in counterterrorism operations that build on the commitments by the Director of Public Prosecutions and Director of Criminal Investigations to address accountability issues. An area of possible entry and support is the newly constituted Civil Rights Division at the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
- ❖ Find opportunities for programmatic linkages with other DFID/FCO projects that work with the ATPU and KDF as part of enhancing accountability in counterterrorism and ensuring that security agencies adhere to the rule of law.
- ❖ Monitor the changing legal and jurisprudential terrain in light of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA).
- ❖ Maintain high-level dialogue with the MoI and the Director of NCTC on the need to protect the civic space to undertake prevention work.
- ❖ Support the development and delivery of a senior staff command course on community relations during Joint Taskforce/Multiagency Operations.
- ❖ Provide technical support to the Joint Taskforce/Multiagency Operations Unit in the NPS for better command-level accountability to address excessively aggressive approaches. Support to partners towards the establishment of a VE observatory initiative to map data and evidence on VE trends and dynamics within and outside the 18 target counties.



3) Tackling violence against women and girls (VAWG)

The Context: Even though there is evidence of a gradual rise in reporting VAWG to the police, most cases still go unreported and among those that are reported very few are prosecuted to the end and even less lead to convictions. Low levels of law enforcement against perpetrators of VAWG are to do with inaccessibility of police stations due to distance but more often fear of survivors that they will not be treated well or that reporting may not help them much. Enforcement of law and order by police and justice system regarding VAWG is weak and not enforced systematically, consistently and efficiently. Arid and Semi-Arid Land (ASAL) regions also suffer lower police station coverage but constantly host security “operations” aimed at stopping escalation of violent localised conflict or fighting mostly cross border violent extremism. Such “operations” are shown to increase violence, such as rape and gang rape, against women and girls.

Challenges

Gender-based Violence (GBV)/VAWG initiatives are known to suffer weak coordination at national but also at county and local levels. Weak coordination negatively affects referrals, case management, and psycho-social and welfare support including rescue and protection measures among others.

There is a weak link between these county gender working groups and national coordinating/oversight and accountability gender mechanisms such as the SDG and NGECC.

The prevalent elder’s justice system offers insignificant protection against VAWG. Reporting is extremely low, prosecutions rare and VAWG mitigation facilities particularly wanting.

Resource conflicts related to mining, development of infrastructure such as ports, expansion of roads and inter-ethnic conflicts and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) lead the established pattern of VAWG that affects women and girls. There are also cases of older women being raped and during security operations. Women and girls often are at the risk of rape as perpetrators use rape as a punishment against communities. There is no evidence that rape incidences involving security actors have ever been addressed legally or form part of the security agenda.

Entry opportunities for REINVENT

- ❖ Support existing County Gender Responsive Initiatives including the uptake of Gender Responsive Budgeting (GRB) that seek to institutionalise GRB in county budgeting processes and Gender Working Groups (GWGs).
- ❖ Support the ongoing adoption of national gender policies to county requirements which should lead to more buy-in and enable additional resources to directly deal with VAWG issues and priority needs.
- ❖ Build on progress already made in KICS-JT supported counties as well as seek to upscale good practice to the new programme areas.
- ❖ Support police/security to comply with UNSCR 1325, and in particular, Preventing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.
- ❖ Support timely data collection and dissemination and utilisation on VAWG.

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4) Peacebuilding

The Context: While efforts to address inter-communal conflicts have variously been put in place by both state and non-state actors and enormous amounts of funds spent, such investment has not succeeded in finding a permanent cure for perennial conflicts. Interventions only manage short lived results in form of cessation of hostilities. National peace architecture is in place with structures running to the county and community levels but there has been a very slow process of ensuring that the structure is solid enough to deal with peace and conflict situations on the ground. Given that the conflict causal factors in most areas are old and have been passed down generations, there has not been a sufficiently innovative approach to effectively address the phenomena. With the advent of devolved governments, conflict response landscape has changed with more local efforts being employed and managed by some of the county governments. However, the response has remained at the level of quelling emerging conflicts and not building peace or addressing foundational causal factors.

Challenges

There are conflict hotspots across all four regions/counties. In West and Rift, the key drivers of conflict include unresolved land disputes, contested boundaries, cattle rustling and political competition. In Coast and North Eastern, conflicts seem to stem from large scale development projects without local community ownership or acceptance, displacements and poor compensations as well as environmental degradation negatively affecting surrounding communities. The Coast region is also highly affected by criminal gangs that terrorise community members, killing, maiming and injuring members of the public. Their actions have been associated with drug use and abuse as well as sponsorship by political profiteers during electoral periods who use them as foot soldiers against their political opponents.

Moreover, resource-based conflicts occur as communities fight over water and pasture, especially during drought periods. This is characteristic of most ASAL areas of the North Eastern region, which experience VE infiltrating communities due to Al-Shabaab’s proximity and high influence and inter-clan-based conflicts perpetrated by political competition and supremacy battles. All political leadership positions at county and national levels have become a major point of contention among different clans in North Eastern and Upper Eastern regions.



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Entry opportunities for REINVENT

- ❖ Seize opportunities in strengthening partnerships between national and county governments and between state and non-state actors including private sector to resolve disputes and focus on conflict sensitive development.
- ❖ Support deeper research and analysis of such effective systems and seek to replicate learning to other counties while upscaling partnerships with cross border programming.
- ❖ Focus sufficient energy and resources on strengthening the function of devolved governments as well as the inter-linkages with national government. Attention should be given to aspects of structures, popular participation, and people-centred decision and policy making processes.
- ❖ Seek partnerships for learning, collaboration and value addition with resilience focused initiatives such as IGAD's Disaster and Draught Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) which would enable the programme to inculcate resilience thinking in peacebuilding.
- ❖ Strengthen elders' councils – especially those who have maintained community respect for their effectiveness in providing community leadership in resolving conflicts and providing Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms.
- ❖ Focus on the youth in all target counties with capacity building programmes to create change agents out of them. These were identified as being critical instruments for active violence, including VAWG, and serving in militia group or criminal gangs.

5) Election Security

The Context: The Independent Review Commission (IREC), in its report famously called the Kriegler report, and the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), popularly referred to as the Waki Commission, both identified that part of the fundamental structural problem was and still is the country's first-past-the-post electoral system and winner takes-it-all outcomes that make elections both high stakes and exclusive. These push election actors to do everything to retain or capture power. Part of what is applied in the high stakes electoral set up includes gerrymandering of electoral constituencies, the utilisation of pre-election violence to displace voters and scare off opposing voter bases and interference with the elections management body (EMB) to control outcomes. The 2022 election cycle will unlikely deviate from this pattern as evidenced by the County Elections Colour Code (Annex I).

Challenges

Given the lethargy in the overhaul of the electoral governance structure, the constitution of IEBC and latent reconfiguration of the electoral landscape from the county to the national level, the 2022 elections will once more pose major challenges to peacebuilding and result in election-related and non-related violence and conflict.

Entry opportunities for REINVENT

- ❖ Working with the Police and the IEBC on Election Security: There is a need to engage the support of an electoral reforms processes by development of a robust Elections Security Governance Approach that takes into account pre-emptive interventions, creation and scaling up of electoral conflict/violence early warning initiatives, training of security services in the application integrity and a human rights-centred approach in electoral security provision and promotion of inclusive election security coordination.
- ❖ Trust building activities between the police and the local political/community actors: This component should be delivered through police and community actors, as it will depolarise tensions and activate the early warning systems for conflict prevention.
- ❖ Coordination of Non-State Election Security Actors: These could include marshalls/non-violence champions (NVCs), long-term mediators and monitors who work with the police to create connections with communities and engage them with a non-violent strategy will be key especially in urban counties such as Nairobi, Kisumu, Mombasa, Nakuru, Eldoret as well as in volatile counties like Uasin Gishu, Na-kuru and Narok.
- ❖ Supply of Non-violent Election Approaches: Support key agencies – for example, the NPS, Office of the DPP, Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (ORPP), NCIC, political parties, judiciary, community councils of elders with evidence, case studies and work plans.



6) Conflict Sensitive Development

The Context: Conflict Sensitive Development (CSD) is a process through which development actors can identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their actual and potential adverse impacts of their operations. The approach helps to understand how social, economic and political conflict interacts with the drivers of conflict from the understanding that that every activity in a local context becomes part of the context and cannot be understood as an external activity. As Kenya strives to become a middle-income country through industrialisation, several activities have been initiated to facilitate this transformation. These changes are happening in a context with existing conflicts and conflict drivers such as competition for political positions, poor management of natural resources, youth bulge, violent extremism and radicalisation of vulnerable groups, increased crime, proliferation of small arms and light weapons among others. This means that development initiatives in this context become part of the conflict dynamics and have the potential to become a platform for addressing conflict if CSD is included in the process.

In the West and Rift region, the main conflict issues include cattle rustling, competition and access over pasture and water, history of cattle rustling and inter and intra-conflicts that extend from neighbouring countries, especially during drought season. The discovery and exploration of resources – oil, minerals and wind power – in this drought prone and unstable region has further fuelled instability. There is no record of conflict assessment reports to enable development actors to understand the context and apply conflict sensitivity in implementing development activities. For instance, Tullow Oil – a multinational company involved in oil extraction in Turkana County – requires a vast amount of water for oil extraction. This has increased demand for water in a region that has acute water challenges and with no alternative sources of water. With this increased demand for water, there will be increased competition between industries and the local population, and between the local communities – particularly, pastoralist communities in the region. These are potential triggers of conflict in a context that has a history of complex ethnic interactions and cattle rustling particularly during drought.

The LAPSET project that brings together Kenya, South Sudan and Ethiopia has major development projects in Lamu that include a port, highways, pipeline, railway line, airport and resort city. The multi-country and multi-county nature of the project has led to multi-levelled conflicts that interact at the local level and across counties. The majority of conflicts are land-related, over compensation and border disputes with neighbouring countries, which affect revenue allocation from the national government.

In the Upper Eastern region, the establishment of conservancies without adequate mechanisms of grazing rights and local benefits from the same presents a high risk of conflict that can spread to adjacent pastoral communities in Laikipia, Kajiado, Isiolo, Samburu and Baringo.

Challenges

Increased competition between industries and the local population, and, between the local communities, such as the pastoralist communities in the region. These are potential triggers of conflict in a context that has a history of complex ethnic interactions and cattle rustling - particularly after drought.

The capture of compensation by local and national purveyors of influence sustains land-related disputes that continue to exacerbate conflict and violence that often displaces and disposes women and girls more harshly. The land conflict has been mainly between indigenous and “outside” communities before narrowing down to kin, family and spouse. The discourse is also extended to employment opportunities in institutions that come with resultant development projects.

In Garissa, Mandera, Wajir counties, access to resources is linked to political leadership and affiliation – which intensified competition for obtaining a political position – is seen as a channel to access resources. In Garissa county, this trend has also amplified clan politics – there are currently tensions between the three dominant clans: Abduak, Auliyen and Abdalla. In Mandera, similar conflict is between the Garre and Degodia clans. Other smaller clans are only relevant during elections when they form alliances with the larger clans.

Development projects by government and multi-national institutions have led to land crises in counties within the region. In Garissa, the construction of a solar plant that was commissioned in 2018 has been delayed due to land compensation issues between the community and the key stakeholder Rural Electrification Authority (REA).

Entry opportunities for REINVENT

- ❖ Develop common national and county level guidelines and principles for counties and for development stakeholders.
- ❖ Lead and facilitate joint conflict assessments with development actors, national and county government and national institutions engaging in short-term and long-term development projects to enable them to have a common understanding of the context of operation that will inform how they engage with the community to address or avoid exacerbating conflict.
- ❖ Support integration of conflict sensitivity programming into national and county development plans. A conflict sensitive approach is critical for national county governments that are engaging in long term development projects and governance in conflict vulnerable contexts.
- ❖ Establish a vibrant knowledge generation system that includes a research, monitoring and evaluation system that will document the value addition of adopting CSD in safety and security (and other inter-related areas such as governance) in Kenya per sectors and levels.





STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

This section identifies potential partners that the REINVENT Programme could work with on the target regions/counties starting with police stations mapping and then state and non-state actors/organisations.



Population served by the police stations: Varied between regions and counties but police stations in urban areas served more people than the rural ones. The range was between 150,000 and 210, 000 people for police stations in urban areas such as Mombasa, and under 100,000 for police stations in rural areas.

Police station mapping

Safety and security issues affect whole communities, involve a lot of actors and require multi-actor and multi-sectoral approaches to address them effectively and sustainably. The following observations emerge based on the available data on police stations:

a) Number of police stations each of the County/Sub-Counties: Varied from region to region and between counties within the same region. The population size and status of an area such as urban or rural influenced the number of police stations in a county. On average, there were at least one to two police stations per sub-county and less than 10 in any of the counties covered in this study.

b) Geographical coverage of the police stations: Varied from region to region. The areas covered were more expansive in North Eastern counties, Upper Eastern counties and Upper Rift Valley counties (Turkana and West Pokot), compared to counties in lower Rift Valley (Nakuru, and Baringo) and Western (Bungoma and Kisumu). Across the regions, a single police station covered mostly a Ward, apart from in North Eastern, Upper Eastern and Upper Rift Valley, where police stations covered an entire sub-county. Although police stations in urban areas such as Mombasa, Garissa, Nakuru, Kisumu, Bungoma, Mandera, Wajir among other towns covered a Ward similar to the rural settings, the geographic scope was much smaller.

c) Population served by the police stations: Varied between regions and counties but police stations in urban areas served more people than the rural ones. The range was between 150,000 and 210, 000 people for police stations in urban areas such as Mombasa, and under 100,000 for police stations in rural areas. Mombasa county was one of the places where data was available for some of the police stations. Available data for five police stations (Bamburi, Nyali, Inuka, Jomvu, and Changamwe) gave a range between 164,000 and 201,000, an average of 185,000 people per police station.

d) Police reform initiatives that had been undertaken in these police stations to enhance security: Across the 18 counties, all forms of police reforms have been initiated in police stations although the extent and effectiveness in the application these reforms varied from stations to another. Police reform initiatives tend to be more visible in urban-based police stations than the rural ones.

e) Specific reform measures to protect women (young & elderly), girls and young boys, children, and persons with disabilities are underway: The most common of these was the existence of a gender desk in most police stations across the regions. There were in most cases separate holding cells for males (adult men and boys) and females (adult women and girls) in the police stations. There were no separate holding cells for children or persons with disabilities.



Stakeholder Mapping

The findings show that in each of the 18 counties across the regions, there are a wide variety of governmental, non-governmental and community level actors involved in safety and security matters. At least nine different types of stakeholders were identified in each county. These categories were as follows:

- 1) National government agencies e.g. local administrators, peace committees, *Nyumba Kumi*, and IEBC.
- 2) County government agencies e.g. village councils.
- 3) Traditional/formal security agencies e.g. NPS, and KDF.
- 4) Community-level peace structures e.g. elders, council of elders, and CBOs.
- 5) NSAs e.g. CSOs security and peace building programmes and projects.
- 6) Community leaders e.g. political leaders, religious leaders, and elders.
- 7) Education institutions e.g. schools.
- 8) Correctional services e.g. judiciary and prisons.
- 9) Private security providers e.g. security firms offering guard services mostly in the urban settings.

These actors play at least three safety and security roles:

- Deterrent role / prevention of crime, conflict and violence: peace committees, *Nyumba Kumi*, religious leaders/inter-faith, schools, elders/council of elders, community leaders, local administration, police; programmes by CSOs, FBOs, CBOs, private security providers, and government agencies)
- Peacebuilding role / resolving or arbitration of disputes (peace committees, *Nyumba Kumi* religious leaders/inter-faith, elders/council of elders, judiciary, political leaders)
- Transformation role / long term prevention of crime, violence, and conflict (CSOs pro-jects/ programmes; government development programmes)

CONCLUSION

From the field research and interviews with key informants, focus group discussions and from the review of the available literature, several cross-cutting issues and concerns emerge if taken together reinforce the need for the REINVENT intervention.

From a violence and conflict persistence perspective, these issues include a fundamental problem of poor police-community relations in all the counties and weaknesses in public order policing due to the lethargy and ambiguity of interests surrounding police transformation. Although Kenya has undertaken policing reforms for about a decade since 2008, the performance of the NPS in effectively responding to crime and on accountability continues to be a matter of public and official concern. However, police service delivery, although improving, faces more urgent demands to shift its focus, as it now must contend with emerging challenges posed by VE and conflicts exacerbated by large scale infrastructure and development projects. Interventions addressing individual and ideological factors should be strategically linked to structural factors to ensure sustainable change. Programmatic interventions to address VE through CSOs are usually small and of a limited time period and it cannot be expected to change the society where they are implemented in the time period.

While the patterns of the conflicts, the nature of grievances and points of contention revolve around boundaries, land and resources, disrupting the cycle of violence remains a governance issue that requires an electoral process devoid of power, ethnic and sectarian capture. Programmatic responses cannot be left to the exclusionist approaches that favour elites, men and political bureaucrats at the expense of women, young people, the upcountry voices and communities who have been traditionally abandoned during post-election elite pacts.

Pre-emptive and behavioural actions aimed at protection and faster responses to the special interests of women and girls should not be limited within but across REINVENT workstreams and partnerships. REINVENT posts a strategic advantage in delivering change in the identified work streams and bring about pace and urgency in disrupting conflict and violence.

2008

Kenya has undertaken policing reforms for about a decade since 2008, the performance of the NPS in effectively responding to crime and on accountability continues to be a matter of public and official concern.

If you have any questions or inquiries about the report, please reach out to us:
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